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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 34 FEBRUARY 1989 NUMBER 1
THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIETY
DONALD E. LIVELY*
I. INTRODUCTION
C ONSTITUTIONAL law is largely the product ofjudicial line-
drawing that charts the perimeters of government power, de-
lineates the contours of personal rights and liberties and thus
traces official bounds of freedom and oppression.' It is a well-
established function of the judiciary "to say what the law is." 2
The etching of constitutional lines, nonetheless, is a treacherous
process that often elicits substantial dispute and distortion. Con-
troversy regarding the nature of the judiciary's workings and the
extent of its role has persisted throughout the Supreme Court's
history.3 The Reagan Administration's effort to shape a Court
committed more to political concepts of self-restraint than to ac-
tivism has been highly focused if not unique.4 Much political
rhetoric, exemplified by President Bush's contradictory pledge to
* Professor, College of Law, The University of Toledo. J.D., University of
California, Los Angeles; M.S., Northwestern University; A.B., University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley.
1. The drafting of a constitution "enable[d] the forces and counterforces of
government to mesh as needed to execute the purposes of the nation in the
community of nations, and to check one another as needed to shield the individ-
ual and community from governmental oppression and discrimination." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2-1 (1978).
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
3. See infra notes 22-23 & 65 and accompanying text.
4. See Taylor, Meese v. Brennan, THE NEW REPUBLIC 17 (Jan. 6 & 13, 1986).
Efforts to extend an administration's influence beyond a president's term in of-
fice by trying to pack the judiciary are not novel. The practice dates back at least
to 1800, when President Adams, in his final days in office, rushed to fill judicial
vacancies with appointees committed to Federalist ideology. The appointment
ofJohn Marshall as ChiefJustice resulted in an activist judiciary that established
the power of judicial review and facilitated the emergence of a strong viable
national government. Thus Adams succeeded in effectuating important Federal-
ist ambitions long after Federalist control of the executive and legislative
branches had ceased. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 1.2-1.4, at 2-10 (1986).
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"appoint judges who will interpret the Constitution as it is writ-
ten" 5 confounds rather than enlightens the debate.
Whether motivated by ideology or by institutional distrust,
blanket opposition to judicial activism is misplaced. History has
demonstrated that constitutional and social damage can be done
pursuant to decision making that is either activist or deferential. 6
Lost in oversimplified debate over the Court's proper role, and
the consequent focus upon two extremes, has been a more sensi-
tive recognition that some forms of activism and restraint are de-
sirable while others are not. The quality and value of discourse
might be enhanced if questions concerning activism were redi-
rected from "whether" to "when" and "how."
The very existence of the judiciary has evoked concern that
the institution is inconsonant with the notion of representative
government. 7 From anxiety that the judiciary-although an in-
dependent and coequal branch of government 8-is anti-demo-
cratic, 9 has emerged sentiment that it must exercise self-restraint.
Critics of so-called judicial activism, who perceive a threat to
democratic or republican principles, have advanced analytical
methodologies calculated to minimize subjective decision-mak-
ing.10 Consequently, they urge judicial review grounded in strict
construction of constitutional text or original intent, or upon neu-
tral principles to ensure results that are detached from personal
5. Vice President Bush, Second Presidential Debate, October 13, 1988.
6. Social and economic change during the first third of the twentieth cen-
tury was obstructed by an activist Court's broad reading of due process and nar-
row reading of the commerce power. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). Official segregation, forced relocation of citizens during war and sup-
pression are among the consequences ofjudicial restraint. See infra notes 66 &
68-71.
7. The central precept of such theorists is that the exercise of power in a
representative democracy must be tied to the consent of the governed. See, e.g.,
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 16-20 (1962). However, the judicial appointment process introduces
political decision making and accountability into the judicial process. See infra
notes 88-89 and accompanying text. Both the President and Senate determine
who will serve as judges and justices. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Further-
more, if the Court strays too far from political consensus, its power may prove
theoretical rather than real because it possesses no enforcement power. See
Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Re-
straint? 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11 (1968). The point was made early and force-
fully when President Jackson reputedly avowed that, "John Marshall has made
his decision; now let him enforce it." L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE
COURT 6 (1985).
8. U.S. CONST. art. III.
9. See supra note 7.
10. For a discussion of theories which propagate the general notions ofju-
dicial restraint, see infra notes 19-64 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 34: p. I
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values or ideology. I I These theories purport to engender deci-
sion-making with a stronger claim to democratic legitimacy.
Warnings regarding the dangers ofjudicial activism often are
coupled with reference to the Lochner era of substantive due pro-
cess review, when the Court elevated freedom of contract to the
status of a paramount constitutional liberty. Although Lochner-
ism represented a misguided breed of activism, ' 2 reference to it is
insufficient as a basis for abandoning all variants of assertive judi-
cial review. The argument for a consistently deferential Court,
even if qualified by tolerance of activism when an explicit guaran-
tee is implicated, leads to the unacceptable conclusion, for in-
stance, that the Court's validation of slavery and refusal to declare
official segregation unconstitutional were correct. These conse-
quences, among others, demonstrate why the Court's role cannot
be premised merely upon cold or uninspired legalism. Insistence
upon a mechanically deferential mode of review ignores the real-
ity that the process of interpreting and applying the law is by its
very nature activist. The notion that courts must be paragons of
automatism is no more sensitive to the interests of constitutional
governance than unvarnished subjectivism.
Invariable bending to majoritarian preferences would make
the judiciary an irrelevant institution and is a recipe for constitu-
tional disparagement. Public trust and confidence actually may
be dependent upon an activist judiciary which is not cowed into
routinely endorsing legislative judgment. The same Court which
has absorbed criticism for Lochnerist decision making, for in-
stance, has commanded praise for striking down official segrega-
tion. Activism, therefore, may be acceptable and even laudable.
Judicial review bestirring the most discomfort seems to occur
when the judiciary delves into constitutional demands and princi-
ples that are not always self-revealing in search of their meaning.
11. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at § 3-6.
12. Substantive due process review that invalidated federal and state legis-
lation during the first third of the twentieth century is averred to almost consen-
sually as a usurpation of legislative authority and misreading of the Constitution.
See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 467-68 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at § 8-6.
Lochnerism was the product of conservative economic philosophies and
anti-labor sentiment harbored by a majority of the Court. See L. BETH, THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1877-1917, at 138-66 (1971); A.
PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULES OF LAW (1969). It was characterized
by close judicial scrutiny of legislative objectives, concerning redistribution of
resources or otherwise reflecting official responses to economic forces, and find-
ings that social and economic regulation were beyond the government's power.
See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at § 8-6.
1989]
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Such inquiry focuses upon and attempts to discern the citizenry's
underlying values. Good activism generally results when the judi-
ciary considers what an enlightened and reflective public would
demand. Judicial review, whether activist or restrained is mis-
placed, however, when it merely aligns itself with popular in-
stincts that are narrow, uninformed, thoughtless or prejudiced, or
advance personal dogma in the disguise of constitutional princi-
ple. Much criticism of activism unfortunately fails to distinguish
properly between the promotion of personal whim or popular
prejudice, and exercises which are an unavoidable and indispen-
sable feature of constitutional society. As a means for curbing
judicial excesses, restraint may engender the greater harm of
paralysis.
The Court's reputation as an institution does not rest upon
its capacity to render and abide by precise legal formulas or main-
tain a low profile. Some of its best moments have included in-
stances in which it transcended legalisms and narrow doctrine
and crafted new constitutional principles based upon discerned
values. Even if not articulated in the Constitution, for instance,
the right of privacy is a Court-recognized guarantee that has
evoked criticism on strict legal grounds, but has generally met
with public approval.I3 Identification of such fundamental rights
is troubling to critics who perceive the Court's decisions as having
anti-democratic overtones and resurrecting discredited concepts
of natural justice. Natural law theories are problematical in the
sense that they breed unresolvable competition between or
among conflicting moralities. Judicial restraint, however, pro-
vides no assurance against resort to natural law or personal sub-
jectivism. Rather, it effectively may disguise activism that, by
purposely evading constitutional inquiry, advances private con-
cepts ofjustice or dogma. As illustrated later, hypocritical profes-
sions of restraint that hide subjectivism are more deserving of
criticism than activism that is open and subject to critical
evaluation.
Arguments against judicial activism too often have been
13. Regardless of whether it can be tied to constitutional text, a right to be
free from official intrusion into the conduct of one's personal life probably is
accepted by most citizens as a basic guarantee. Because the right is not identi-
fied by any constitutional text, however, recognition of the right has begotten
criticism on the basis that it was bred by "formulas based on 'natural justice,' . ..
[which] require judges to determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis
of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary." Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-12 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 34: p. I
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overbroad, misdirected and even disingenuous. The purpose of
this essay is to: (1) identify some common and exaggerated con-
cerns about judicial activism and debunk the common rationales
for and theories of judicial restraint; (2) illustrate how activism
may be essential both to the judiciary's effectiveness and esteem
as well as to society's well-being; and (3) explain how the judiciary
is accountable to the citizenry and structure criteria for discerning
between acceptable and intolerable forms of activism.
II. JUDICIAPHOBIA AND THEORIES OF RESTRAINT
The concept of an activist judiciary more often than not elic-
its an almost reflexive negative response rather than thoughtful
consideration of the merits of its proper utilization. Notions that
the Court should perform a mere mechanical function were ar-
ticulated early in its history and periodically have been restated
and embellished. Justice Story described the Constitution as
"practical [in] nature .... designed for common use and fitted for
common understanding."' 14 A century later, Justice Roberts ob-
served that the Court need only "lay the article of the
[C]onstitution which is involved beside the statute which is chal-
lenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the for-
mer.' 15 Such exponents of judicial restraint have left enduring
impressions upon the legal community, but these individuals are
probably largely forgotten by the general citizenry. Many of the
justices best and most positively remembered by the public are
those who transcended mere legal doctrine and rote recitations
and were able to bond their thinking with common human con-
cerns.16 The recent failure of the Bork nomination constitutes
fresh evidence for the proposition that society requires not only
intellectual capacity but tangible evidence of compassion, flexibil-
ity and other overtly humane traits.' 7 Nevertheless, the search for
someone whom opponents would "object to just as much"' 8 as
they did to Bork, suggests that investment in concepts of judicial
restraint endures.
14. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 451, at 333 (4th ed. 1873).
15. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1935) (agricultural production
tax struck down because purpose, regulation and control of agricultural produc-
tion beyond powers delegated to federal government).
16. See infra note 17.
17. See Greenfield, Privacy and the Undressed, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1987, at
100.
18. Press Pot and Politics, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 16, 1987, at 46.
1989]
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A. The Theory and Impracticability of Strict Constructionism
Theories ofjudicial restraint have been propounded under a
variety of labels. Justice Black advanced the starkest version by
regularly insisting that "the Court has no power to add to or sub-
tract from the procedure set forth by the Founders.' 9 Central to
such strict constructionism is the notion that the Court should
read the Constitution "in a straightforward manner . . . paying
close attention to its words and avoid twisting or stretching [its]
meanings [so] there will be few occasions for controversies that
can be manipulated .... ,20 Justice Black thus promoted fidelity
to constitutional text as a methodology to ensure results that
would be objectively right rather than influenced by personal
preference or ideology. 2'
Insofar as the Court must make essentially mechanical deci-
sions, such as whether a person who is not a citizen or resident of
the United States or is under the age of thirty may serve as Presi-
dent or in the Senate, 22 a simple textual focus is sufficient. Pure
literalism has little if any utility, however, as a guide for reading
such critical passages as "freedom of speech, or of the press," 23
"unreasonable searches," 24 "speedy trial," 25 "impartial jury," 26
"Assistance of Counsel for his Defence," 27 "Excessive bail,"28
"cruel and unusual punishment," 29 "privileges and immuni-
ties,"30 "due process"' and "equal protection."3 2 The belief
that such language is scrutable, if only closely read, ignores the
patent ambiguities requiring an effort to suffuse the language
19. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970) (BlackJ., dissenting). Pursuant
to Black's thinking, the Court should not infer constitutional principles from the
perceived spirit or nature of the Constitution or recognize peripheral constitu-
tional rights to help secure specific ones. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 507-27 (1965) (BlackJ., dissenting) (government may invade individ-
ual's privacy unless prohibited by specific constitutional provision).
20. L. TRIBE, supra note 7, at 41.
21. See id., at 41-49; Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 703 (1975).
22. Such eligibility standards for the Presidency and the Senate are set re-
spectively by U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 and art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
29. Id.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. Id.
32. Id.
[Vol. 34: p. I
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with meaning and thus relevance. The ninth and tenth amend-
ments, which reserve unspecified powers to the people3 3 and the
states, 34 on their face are bereft of precise meaning. The pres-
ence of such open-ended residual provisions reinforces the no-
tion that an active reading and application of the Constitution is
not only desirable but necessary.
The futility of strict literalism is further evidenced by the tor-
tured mental gymnastics which must be resorted to on its behalf.
Justice Black consistently subscribed to the notion that the first
amendment's guarantees were unequivocal.3 5 Yet, his strict con-
structionist premise eventually failed as an analytical device for
delineating the contours of freedom of expression. The term
"speech" is not defined by the Constitution and, because it can be
read broadly to include symbolic expression or narrowly to in-
clude only verbal communication, 36 eventually it required inter-
pretation. By concluding that speech and conduct were
conceptually and constitutionally separate, Justice Black settled
for a distinction that was more convenient than principled.37 Jus-
tice Black's adoption of a more restrictive meaning of "speech"
represented his participation in active, competitive line-drawing.
An exclusively textual focus thus proved inadequate in the hands
of perhaps its most prominent and ardent enthusiast.
B. The Theory and Impracticability of Original Intent
Strict constructionism by itself, as noted, is patently insuffi-
cient as a guide to reading much of the Constitution. Urgings for
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The ninth amendment provides: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." Id.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
35. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56-80 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (first amendment should prevent state from denying admission to
bar applicant for refusing to answer questions pertaining to membership in
Communist party).
36. The wearing of black armbands to protest the Vietnam War, for in-
stance, was considered within the purview of speech by a majority of the Court.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06
(1969). Justice Black, however, would have placed conduct, such as "[s]tanding,
patrolling, or marching" beyond the perimeters of speech. Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring). He likewise would have found
an offensive message emblazoned on ajacket and displayed in protest of govern-
ment policy, to be unprotected conduct. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27
(1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
37. See Cox, 379 U.S. at 580-81 (Black, J., concurring).
1989]
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judicial restraint consequently have been augmented by interpre-
tivist notions, such as originalism and neutrality,38 which essen-
tially would afford the judiciary additional but minimal latitude in
reading and applying the Constitution. Such concepts if fully
subscribed to, however, would weaken the judicial process with-
out necessarily curbing judicial subjectivism.
The notion that the Court, when confronted with vague or
facially indeterminate language need only refer to the original in-
tent of the Framers, is delusionary. 39 Delegates to the Constitu-
tional Convention, like the states which ratified the Constitution,
may have supported a given provision for diverse reasons. 40 Con-
sequently, identification of a singular intent is at best the product
of guesswork and at worst a self-serving fabrication. 4' Thus,
originalism invites activism without meaningful guidance.
Even if it were possible to discern the Framers' intent, it
would not necessarily follow that an identified purpose at the time
of enactment or ratification should govern the present or the fu-
ture. Segregated schools were commonplace in the North42 and
public education was an undeveloped and marginal social institu-
tion,43 for instance, when the fourteenth amendment was
adopted. At the time, many of the provision's architects consid-
ered liberty of contract to be a key to equal protection and proba-
bly did not intend to prohibit school segregation. 44 Reference to
original intent would be misplaced in a modern equal protection
38. For a more comprehensive recitation of the theories, see A. BICKEL,
supra note 7; L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958); Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). For critical responses,
see Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court. Some Intersections Between
Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968); Tushnet, Following the Rules
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781
(1983); Wright, supra note 7.
39. Such a focus actually may divert necessary attention from difficult ques-
tions that merit at least the effort to answer. See L. TRIBE, supra note 7, at 47-49.
40. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968). Even those
closely associated with the doctrine ofjudicial restraint have acknowledged that
the collective purpose of a governing body is difficult if not impossible to dis-
cern. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2605 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 782-83 (1977) (Rehnquist,J., dis-
senting) (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 265 (1977)).
4 1. Insofar as a constitutional provision resulted from assorted purposes, it
is conceivable that the process of divining original intent may devolve into a
search for the most serviceable motive.
42. See L. TRIBE, supra note 7, at 46; Tushnet, supra note 38, at 800.
43. See Tushnet, supra note 38, at 800.
44. Id.
[Vol. 34: p. I
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context, therefore, to the extent that it would disregard the al-
tered dimensions and priorities of separate contexts. Education
eventually supplanted freedom of contract 45 as a perceived key to
equal opportunity. Inquiries into equal protection like other con-
stitutional issues thus require adaptation to altered perceptions
and acquired knowledge. 46
Resistance to adaptive analysis elevates the Constitution's ar-
chitects to a mythical status of omniscience and discounts the
ability of subsequent generations to engage in a critical facet of
self-governance. Issues regularly arise that could not have been
anticipated when the Constitution was drafted. The record of the
Constitutional Convention is bereft of any contemplation, for in-
stance, of whether electronic eavesdropping is subject to the
fourth amendment's reasonable search standards, 47 or whether
the electronic media are part of the press and thereby protected
by the first amendment. 48 A principled search for the Framers'
intent in those instances inescapably necessitates the conscien-
tious exercise of discretion, which is the source of distress for
proponents of originalism.
Insistence upon resort to Framers' intent is further disquiet-
ing to the extent it represents a preference for the judgment of
the Constitution's architects in favor of their progeny-who must
confront details never contemplated by the drafters but who pos-
sess the accumulated wisdom of two centuries of constitutional
experience. Blind faith in the Framers represents investment in a
manifestly imperfect body evidenced among other things by the
original conditioning of constitutional rights and liberties on race
and gender. Further unvarying subscription to early visions and
perceptions disregards the reality that much valuable constitu-
tional law has evolved from experience rather than original dic-
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Wiretapping, when first considered by the Court, was found to consti-
tute neither a search nor seizure for fourth amendment purposes. See Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
48. New media, such as motion pictures, were originally regarded as be-
yond the purview of the press and merely as "business, pure and simple." Mu-
tual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915), overruled by
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). Although eventually recog-
nized as part of the press, the electronic media's constitutional protection is di-
luted. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27
(1943) (Federal Communication Commission's denial of radio licenses to per-
sons engaged in network practices contrary to public interest not violative of
first amendment).
1989]
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tate. Finally singular investment in the Framers' intent at the
expense of acquired knowledge, evinces undue reverence for the
Constitution's architects and has limited utility in ensuring a char-
ter with enduring relevance.
C. The Theory and Impracticability of Neutral Principles
Fear of and opposition to judicial activism has fostered think-
ing to the effect that "[w]here constitutional materials do not
clearly specify the value to be preferred, there is no principled
way to prefer any claimed human value to any other ... [so a]
judge must stick close to the text and the history, and their fair
implications, and not construct new rights."'49 The so-called
"neutral principles model of review" translates essentially into a
demand for objective constancy. A court's obligation in a given
case, pursuant to that analytical formula, would be to devise gen-
eral principles that favored no particular group and apply them
consistently even if later they might be subjectively distasteful. 50
Neutrality or consistency is better consigned to theory than
practice. A court that found discrimination unconstitutional be-
cause race should be irrelevant, for instance, might consider itself
obligated to find affirmative action unconstitutional pursuant to
the same principle and thus reach a consistent result. The neu-
trality concept is sufficiently malleable, however, to permit a court
to reach a contrary but principled decision. An equally neutral
premise, making race irrelevant unless the classification touched a
group traditionally excluded from, or underrepresented in the
political process, could support findings that discrimination gen-
erally was unconstitutional but permissible if tied to affirmative
action.
At its worst, the neutral principles formula may translate into
blind adherence to precedent. In demanding school desegrega-
tion in the face of massive southern resistance, the Court con-
cluded that neighborhood school, student transfer and freedom
of choice plans did not satisfy equal protection demands for a uni-
tary school system.5 ' A court should not be disabled from consid-
ering at a later time, however, whether such methodologies may
49. Bork, supra note 38, at 8.
50. See Tushnet, supra note 38, at 805-06.
51. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ("freedom of
choice" plan could not effectuate transition to unitary system); Griffin v. County
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964) (closing public schools for which desegre-
gation ordered while at same time increasing funding for white children at pri-
vate schools denied black children equal protection); Goss v. Board of Educ.,
[Vol. 34: p. I
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promote equal protection ends by deterring resegregation. 52
Insistence upon utilization of neutral principles would de-
mand performance that is unrealistic and constitutionally dero-
gating. It would be inconsistent with elementary and consensual
limiting principles of judicial review, for instance, if a judge for-
mulated law in anticipation of dimensions that had yet to un-
fold. 53 The neutral principles formula, given its demand for
consistency, might invite contemplation of future possibilities
even if not immediately relevant. Concern with the risk of articu-
lating a principle that may prove undesirable in the long-term
might undermine the quality of an immediate decision. Although
a principle may be embraced in one instance, enduring adherence
to it may be a reflection of stubborn and obsolete thinking rather
than enlightened thought. Insistence upon congruency of results
in purportedly similar instances disregards inevitable disagree-
ment over what facts and issues are genuinely alike. It also may
have no deterrent effect upon a result-oriented judge who reason-
ably might expect never to face a comparable case in the future or
otherwise is determined to reach a certain outcome.
The neutral principles model is especially flawed because of
its presumption that a singular principle links multifold decisions
into a coherent body of law. Constitutional rulings tend to be
based upon multiple principles, rather than any single unifying
one, and the relative emphasis upon such principles may vary.
For instance, the Court originally held that a shopping center was
the functional equivalent of a company town and thus peaceful
labor picketing could not be enjoined. 54 Although it appeared
that the nature of the forum was the determinative concern in that
case, another principle-the nature of the expression-was piv-
otal in a subsequent but similar case. In the subsequent case, the
Court upheld an injunction against anti-war leafleting at a shop-
ping center because the expression did not relate to the site's ac-
373 U.S. 683, 685-87 (1963) (striking down transfer systems because such sys-
tems perpetuate segregation).
52. See Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 530 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
Board of Educ. v. Powell, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986) (remedies for dismantling dual
school system may be discontinued once unitary system effectuated).
53. The "policy of strict necessity in disposing of constitutional issues" dis-
favors a focus that is broader than "required by the precise facts to which the
ruling is to be applied." Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69
(1947). Thus, prophesying would contravene some basic constitutionally de-
rived principles of judicial restraint.
54. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
391 U.S. 308, 319 (1968).
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tivities. 55 To the extent decisions rest upon multiple principles,
therefore, neutrality is no assurance against varying or conflicting
results begotten by a shift in emphasis or tone.56
What might otherwise appear to be a deviation from a previ-
ously enunciated principle may also follow from the evolution of
principles, neither formulated nor foreseen, when an initial deci-
sion was rendered. The determination that automobiles could be
searched without a warrant was originally tied to their mobility.57
Later, in justifying warrantless searches even if an automobile had
been immobilized, the Court noted that individuals have a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle. 58 A different re-
sult would have followed in the later case if the initial concern
with mobility had governed. Enunciation of a neutral principle
does not preclude amplification or augmentation and, therefore,
does not necessarily deter results that the original formulation
might not countenance.
Theories of judicial restraint not only have been generally
unpersuasive but, if affirmatively responded to, would facilitate
adverse consequences. Judicial reticence might ensure that con-
stitutional inquiry would terminate where meaningful analysis
should commence. The notion that a judge can discover the
meaning of and properly apply the Constitution, if text and his-
tory are closely scrutinized, or principles are consistent, ignores
the nature of the Constitution and is fundamentally naive. As
noted above, constitutional text and history generally are un-
revealing, so an examination of underlying principles and a will-
ingness to etch and adjust lines are essential for any analysis that
is pertinent to modern circumstances. To the extent the judiciary
presents any danger to a democratic or republican system, the
threat is magnified by a functioning that is mechanical rather than
enlightened.
55. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 564 (1972).
56. The Court eventually determined that speech content was an irrelevant
concern and concluded that privately owned shopping centers were not so akin
to company towns that the state action doctrine should operate. See Hudgens v.
N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
57. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The basic concern, given
probable cause that the motor vehicle contained contraband, was that it readily
could be moved out of the jurisdiction and evidence would be lost. Id. at 153.
58. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). By focusing upon a di-
minished expectation of privacy, rather than exigent circumstances, the Court
was able to justify a warrantless search regardless of whether the vehicle might
later be moved. Id. at 12-13.
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III. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: REFLECTIONS OF AN
ENLIGHTENED CITIZENRY
Given the Court's role of reviewing and sometimes displac-
ing or redressing governmental action and policy, it is not sur-
prising that "[elvery Justice has been accused of legislating and
everyone has joined in that accusation of others." 59 As noted
above, however, much key constitutional language is facially inde-
terminate, and the collective intent of the drafters, like legislators,
is generally undecipherable. 60 Constitutional analysis thus must
include apprehension and adaptation of principles underlying the
text.
Constitutional perimeters are charted or realigned regardless
of whether the review process is characterized as active or re-
strained.6' Neither label denotes whether a judge will use or
abuse his or her power to promote constitutional interests.
Cramped readings of due process or equal protection guarantees
may satisfy proponents of restraint, but even such interpretation
actively defines or redefines official power. Failure to examine the
spirit of the Constitution, or discern rights that may be implicit
rather than expressed, can reflect judicial law-making purporting
to be restrained but which may be both activist and mischievous.
The Court's invalidation of social and economic policies dur-
ing the first third of this century, despite their enactment through
59. R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERN-
MENT 80 (1955).
60. For a discussion of the difficulty in discerning legislative intent, see
supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
61. Courts make law even when they do nothing, since deference to legisla-
tive judgment affirms and validates whatever scheme may be at issue and defines
any affected rights accordingly. The Court's embrace of the desegregation prin-
ciple illustrates the point. By actively emphasizing the equality component of
the fourteenth amendment, the Court impaired what "can be called a 'freedom'
[for the liberty interest] of the white." Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Deci-
sions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 429 (1960). Had it been deferential to legislative action,
however, the Court still would have been activist to the extent that it presided
over the elevation of liberty above equality interests. Deference to liberty inter-
ests may be a "thin disguise" for official displacement of equal protection.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing
Court's upholding Louisiana statute which required railroad companies to pro-
vide separate accommodations for white and black passengers).
The Court, in Scott v. Sandford, pretended to exercise self-restraint in not-
ing that "[ilt is not the province of the [C]ourt to decide upon the justice or
injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws." Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393, 405 (1856). The decision, however, evoked criticism and harvested
shame on grounds that the Court had actively advanced its own conviction that
blacks were inherently inferior and thus had intervened as "the citadel of slave-
ocracy." A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO BURGER 16 (1979).
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the representative process, has been widely condemned as an es-
pecially prominent example of judicial imperialism. 62 The
Lochnerist period has been described as one in which the Court
freely and without principle measured the wisdom of state and
federal legislatures against its own subjectivism primarily and
against constitutional principle as an afterthought. 63 Criticism of
Lochnerism may be deserved but for the most part it is exagger-
ated and misplaced. The Court has been accused of Lochnerist
thinking in more modern times, for example, for constructing a
right of privacy or engaging in elevated equal protection review
regarding classifications other than race. 64 Such a response sug-
gests that the wrong lessons have been learned from Lochnerism.
Analogy to Lochnerism fails because modern decisions, including
those recognizing rights to privacy and freedom to associate or
travel, vindicate rather than repress values to which an enlight-
ened and reflective citizenry would subscribe. Lochnerism is a
unique and especially poor reference point for assessing activism,
moreover, insofar as the citizenry and its representatives rather
than the Court had taken the lead in adapting basic values to
changing circumstances.
Constitutional principles held hostage to unreflective whims
or instincts by either the judiciary or the public merits objection.
Still, criticism of activism tends to become especially pointed
when it overrides legislative enactments representing
majoritarian sentiment. Decision making tied to imminent tem-
perament more than enlightened or abiding values, however, may
be short-sighted and self-destructive. 65 Long-term institutional
prestige and respect actually may necessitate decisions which are
contrary to popular custom or conventional thinking. Although
no equal protection clause existed at the time of the Court's pro-
slavery decisions, for instance, ample wisdom existed which could
have been the basis of an enlightened decision consistent with
62. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 421 U.S. 441, 467-68 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 8-4, -6.
63. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 8-6.
64. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 406-07 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting) (Court's displacement of legislative findings regarding fetal viability
constitutes unjustified invasion upon state power); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 407 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (recognition of marriage as constitu-
tionally protected privacy interest is Lochnerist); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 507-08 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (recognition of right of privacy
perverts concept of substantive due process).
65. First amendment decisions that responded to popular but exaggerated
fears, for instance have detracted from, rather than contributed to, the Court's
and the nation's heritage. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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constitutional principle. The Court's upholding of slavery, even
if purportedly deferential to original intent,66 devastated public
confidence in the Court and is a lasting monument to stunted
constitutional vision. 67 Other decisions that have diminished its
standing, from a historical perspective, have included those af-
firming the separate but equal doctrine, 68 forced relocation of cit-
izens of Japanese descent during World War 11,69 imprisonment
of government critics during the Great Red Scare of the 1920's,70
and McCarthyism of the 1950's. 71 Those decisions, even if con-
sistent with popular sentiment at the time, or the product of def-
erence to legislative judgment, have since become regarded as
unqualified stains upon the Court's record. Each also demon-
strates why it is essential to discern the spirit, rather than just read
the letter, of the Constitution.
The Court's eventual and activist determination that racial
separation was inherently unequal72 and its consequent insistence
upon desegregation, 73 although the source of immediate contro-
versy and hostility, is generally regarded as one of its finer mo-
66. As mentioned in note 61, supra, the Court's purported adherence to
judicial restraint in Scott v. Sandford was questionable. Instead of declaring Mis-
souri rather than Illinois law controlling, the Court invalidated the Missouri
Compromise and further asserted that Congress was powerless to grant citizen-
ship to slaves. Affirmance of slavery represented, prior to the Civil War, the
Court's only interference with Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.
Purported fealty to framers' intent, masking perceptions of blacks as inferior
persons, thus engendered a morally and politically bankrupt decision and wide-
spread vilification of the Court. See R. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME
COURT 93-96 (1960).
67. R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 66; see also A. MASON, supra note 61, at 16.
68. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
69. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding Congress'
exclusion of individuals of Japanese ancestry from certain military areas).
70. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (upholding California stat-
ute prohibiting advocacy of anarchism, thereby upholding conviction of partici-
pant in meeting of Communist party); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
(upholding New York statute prohibiting advocacy of anarchism, thereby up-
holding the conviction of publisher of left wing manifesto); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (sustaining convictions of bolshevik sympathizers
pursuant to Espionage Act); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (uphold-
ing imprisonment of socialist party leader for making an anti-war speech);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 647 (1919) (upholding imprisonment of
protestors who distributed anti-conscription circulars).
71. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (upholding conviction of
communist party member); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (up-
holding conspiracy convictions of Communist party members).
72. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
73. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18-
32 (1971) (school board's desegregation plan judged by its effectiveness; burden
on school board to prove one-race school not caused by past or present discrim-
ination); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) (rejecting
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ments. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court overtly relied
upon social science data in substituting its wisdom for legislative
judgment and social custom. 7 4 Thus its decision was unequivo-
cally activist. What made Brown a positive contribution to the
Court's legacy was its contemplation and comprehension of what
an enlightened and informed, rather than an impassioned
or prejudiced citizenry would demand from the Constitution.
What distinguishes Brown from Lochner is that instead of impeding
the evolution of a policy tied to fundamental values subscribed to
by a reflective public, the Court facilitated such interests. Dis-
placement of majoritarian or strongly held sentiments, even if
they are irrational or unlinked to normative values, may engender
resentment, as the desegregation mandate did. To the extent the
Court's decision is tied to fundamentally identifiable values that
the populace itself may aspire toward, but does not necessarily
reflect at a given moment, the eventual inclination to revere
Brown but despise Lochner becomes consonant and
understandable.
In probing the citizenry's conscience when necessary, the
Court must nonetheless observe limits that ensure it does not
simply package its subjective preferences in the wrapping of con-
stitutional principle. Because review pursuant to broad notions
of compassion and justice can translate into judicial imperial-
ism, 75 it is essential not only to identify limits but to know when
they are reached. Construction of limiting principles is a treach-
erous process, as the evolution of the desegregation mandate it-
self demonstrates. Given public hostility to busing and possible
pervasive expansion of segregation remedies to the North and
West, the Court curbed the reach of the desegregation princi-
ple, 76 grafted a discriminatory intent requirement upon it7 7 and
county's freedom of choice plan allowing students to decide in which school they
would enroll).
74. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n. 11. The Court noted the findings of sociolo-
gists, anthropologists, and psychiatrists in concluding that segregation fostered
a sense of inferiority. Id.
75. The Court has asserted that if it literally applied equal protection rules
to all legislation, "very few laws . . . would survive [them]." United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
76. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(majority's holding limiting inter-school district remedies for segregation was
more "reflection of public mood" than "product of neutral principles"). See gen-
erally B. SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY 186-89 (1986).
77. "[Tlhe differentiating factor between dejure segregation and so-called
defacto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate." Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (emphasis in original); see also Washington v.
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thus restricted its use to eradication of officially segregated
schools. 78 Criticism of the desegregation formula, which origi-
nally was tied to its very existence, thereafter could be directed
toward its enfeeblement. 79
Adoption of the discriminatory intent requirement consti-
tuted a significant turning point in the Court's equal protection
thinking that eventually could detract from a positive legacy. It
represented a softening of the Court's insistence upon desegrega-
tion and was responsive to strident but largely transient public
sentiments. 80 By contouring equal protection doctrine in a way
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-41 (1976) (upholding use of test to screen applicants
for police force, even though test had negative impact on blacks). Thus, "a find-
ing of intentionally segregative [action creates] a primafacie case of unlawful seg-
regative design on the part of school authorities." Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208. It has
been noted that whatever advances have been made in dismantling officially seg-
regated systems, "[n]o comparable progress has been made in many non-
southern cities ... primarily because of the defacto/dejure distinction nurtured
by the courts and accepted complacently by many of the same voices which de-
nounced the evils of segregated schools in the South." Id. at 218-19 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell would have abolished
the dejure/defacto line on the grounds that desegregation was intended to equal-
ize educational opportunities and segregative intent does not alter the effect
upon that opportunity. Id. at 218-19, 229-30 & 252-53 (Powell,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
78. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744-45 (rejecting district court's finding of pur-
poseful discriminatory state action and consequent interdistrict remedy).
79. In narrowing the ambit of the desegregation mandate, the Court has
concluded that resegregation following a desegregation order reflects a "normal
pattern of human migration." Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S.
424, 436 (1976). Such language is reminiscent of the refrain, in Plessy v. Fergu-
son, that segregation is "in the nature of things." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 544 (1856).
To the extent discriminatory intent may be easily disguised or is uncon-
scious, an equal protection violation may be impossible to prove. Laws that re-
quire segregation are patently discriminatory and vulnerable, but government
action neutral on its face requires a searching inquiry that often will be unpro-
ductive. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-74 (1979) (Mas-
sachusetts law giving veterans preference for state civil service jobs did not
unconstitutionally discriminate against women). Because "reliable evidence of
subjective intentions is seldom obtainable," factors such as "degree, inevitabil-
ity, and foreseeability of any disproportionate impact as well as alternatives rea-
sonably available" have to be assessed before a court may infer discriminatory
intent. Id. at 283 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Such analysis by its nature, however,
may amount to little more than guesswork and is a "tortuous effort." Keyes, 413
U.S. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court
itself has acknowledged that it is "extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the
motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative
enactment." Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (citing United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968)).
80. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 814-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting); B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 76, at 186-89. As it turns out, the public generally has come to accept
busing and other assertive remedies as necessary means for effectuating equal
protection aims. See generally L. HARRIS, INSIDE AMERICA (1987).
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that catered to aroused majoritarian inclinations, the Court ironi-
cally has helped perpetuate or restore segregated schools without
even insisting on an accompanying equality requirement.8'
The Court, even when its activism results in error, should be
criticized for wrong-headedness but not necessarily for constitu-
tional overreaching. For example, it wrongly concluded that the
rights of viewers and listeners were paramount to the rights of
broadcasters and thus found fairness regulation constitutional. 82
The Court was mistaken because the fairness doctrine disserved
both constitutional and regulatory objectives. The decision, how-
ever, reflected a worthy motive of ensuring that individual views
and diversity were not lost in what had become the dominant
modern mass medium.83 Even the Court's standing of first
amendment text on its ear, by elevating the interests of listeners
above speakers, might have been palatable if fairness regulation
promoted rather than undermined first amendment values.84
The Court should not be institutionally faulted when it as-
pires to identify and respond to the normative expectations and
values of an enlightened citizenry. More than once the judiciary
has protected constitutional interests from ill-conceived
majoritarian or legislative sentiments that would subordinate on
the basis of race, suppress expression, or promote other mischief
to fundamental values. As the Court's original deferral to and
later resistance to involuntary sterilization schemes demonstrate,
activism is an essential and sometimes final resort of a constitu-
tional society.85
81. See Lively, The Effectuation and Maintenance of Integrated Schools: Modern
Problems in a Post-Desegregation Society, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 117, 126-27 (1987). The
devolution of the desegregation mandate, however, defuses a fundamental
premise of activist criticism. The eventual emergence of limiting principles in
conformance with perceived majoritarian sentiment contradicts much imagery
of the judiciary as being insensitive to public will or anti-democratic. For a dis-
cussion of judicial accountability to the citizenry, see infra notes 88-89 and ac-
companying text.
82. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-91 (1969). At
issue in Red Lion was whether the "fairness doctrine," imposed on broadcasters
by the FCC, which required that broadcasters give those with differing views on
the same issue equal and fair coverage was constitutional.
83. As of 1987, television and radio were present in 98% and 99% of the
nation's households, respectively. Daily newspapers, in contrast, reached barely
more than 25% of the population in 1986. Statistical Abstract of the United
States 1988, No. 878 at 523.
84. Eventually recognizing that the principle disserved the first amendment
interests of broadcasters and the public, the FCC recently abandoned the fair-
ness doctrine. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 5043 (1987).
85. In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), the Court upheld a Virginia stat-
ute that authorized the involuntary sterilization of patients in state mental insti-
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IV. LEARNING TO LOVE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Improvident constitutional line-drawing may merit criticism,
but it affords no more support for having the Court restrict its
role than poor policy judgment by the executive or legislative
branches would militate in favor of self-emasculation. Good faith
by government is a normative expectation of the public, which
assumes that officials will generally perform their duties conscien-
tiously. No sound reason exists for excluding the judiciary from
the implications of that assumption, not only as it reviews laws
amenable to mechanical application, but also as it identifies and
demands adherence to basic values.
Fear of the judiciary nonetheless persists insofar as it is per-
ceived to be an anti-democratic and counter-majoritarian force.8 6
As noted previously, the Court's function and prestige may neces-
sitate displacing legislative judgment and transcending prevailing
public sentiment. Failure to eventually recognize misapprehen-
sion or error in discerning fundamental values properly should
beget the buffeting, pressure and even bullying, that dogmatic in-
transigence merits. In that sense, President Roosevelt's Court-
packing plan, which finally helped effectuate Lochnerism's de-
mise,87 was a positive rather than negative response. If the strat-
egy is subject to any criticism, the most pertinent one may be that
it was a belated checking exercise contemplated by a dynamic
framework of separation of powers.
Rather than being detached from the political process, the
judiciary is very much the product of and subject to democratic
forces. Judges and justices are nominated by the President and
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. 88 Contrary
to conventional wisdom, screening of a judicial nominee by an
elected president and the Senate can shape the judiciary.8 9 Con-
tutions who suffered from hereditary forms of "insanity or imbecility." Fifteen
years later, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court invalidated
an Oklahoma statute providing for the involuntary sterilization of "habitual
criminals."
86. Thus, it has been asserted that "when the Supreme Court declares un-
constitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the
will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises
control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it. That .. .is the
reason the charge can be made that judicial review is undemocratic." A. BICKEL,
supra note 7, at 16-17.
87. SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 4, § 2.6, at 33-35.
88. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
89. Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In Search of Constitutional
Roles and Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 554-55, 557-59 (1986).
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firmation of a judge or justice translates into willingness of the
executive and legislative branches, representing majoritarian
public will, to subject themselves and their actions to the ap-
pointee's constitutional judgment. A judicial appointment
thereby represents consent of those who govern and, in a repre-
sentative system, consent of the governed to subsequent judicial
action.
The judiciary is held to a double standard to the extent that
poor performance, or even disregard for the Constitution by
more directly representative institutions, may be more readily
countenanced. The judiciary is not the only branch of the gov-
ernment obligated to read the Constitution9° and capable of sub-
jective or self-serving interpretation. 9 1 Nor is it uniquely capable
of disrupting democratic or constitutional principles. Because it
has no enforcement power and thus cannot lead where the execu-
tive, legislature and public will not follow, 9 2 however, the Court
may pose the least threat to democratic values. Experience sug-
gests that more profound harm to those interests has originated
with executive or legislative readings of the Constitution and cor-
responding actions that traumatized fundamental values. 93 Inso-
far as the Court has affirmed executive or legislative judgment in
those instances, the case for active judicial review is strengthened
rather than weakened.
Still, the judiciary is not right merely because it says it is
90. Both the executive and legislative branches are obligated to conform
their actions to constitutional standards. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,
18 (1958).
91. The executive branch, for instance, has advanced the notion that it pos-
sesses inherent power to suppress information in the interest of national security
and to maintain absolute secrecy with respect to all presidential communica-
tions. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723 (1971) (na-
tional security claim to suppress Pentagon Papers); see also United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (absolute privilege claim to suppress tapes of Oval
Office conversations). The Court in both cases rejected the executive branch's
interpretation of the Constitution. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714; Nixon,
418 U.S. at 713.
92. The Court has recognized this reality from the moment it asserted the
power of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803). Knowing that President Jefferson would disregard an order to deliver
judicial commissions to last minute Federalist appointees, ChiefJustice Marshall
established thejudiciary's power but denied a remedy in order to avert an invari-
ably losing battle with the executive. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra note 4, § 1.2, at 2-3.
93. Even if deferred to by the judiciary, constitutional affronts such as the
"separate but equal doctrine," relocation of citizens of Japanese ancestry from
certain areas during war time and various suppressions of first amendment free-
doms originated with the executive or legislative branches. For a discussion of
these cases, see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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right. Although it has the power "to say what the law is," 9 4 such
authority does not necessarily make a judgment the final word if
the reading proves unacceptable. If the Court reaches too far or
pushes too hard, society may ignore it or resort to the democratic
process of amending the Constitution.95 To the extent such re-
jection does not occur, however, it may be assumed that even de-
cisions which might not have reflected popular sentiment when
rendered eventually have received the imprint of democratic
consent. 9
6
The record demonstrates that activism consonant with the vi-
sion of an enlightened and reflective citizenry, as exemplified by
such results as the invalidation of official segregation, survives as
an essential effectuating mechanism for basic values. Activism
promoting the personal ideology of the Court, or underdevel-
oped preferences of an uninformed or prejudiced citizenry, re-
sulting in slavery, forced relocation of citizens during wartime,
forced sterilization and other misconceived schemes has eventu-
ally been regretted and defeated by more thoughtful popular
judgment. Activism thus ultimately is susceptible to the public
marketplace which, in the event of overreaching, will beget persis-
tent legislative or executive efforts to defeat the judiciary. The
demise of Lochnerism, curbing of the desegregation principle
and future confirmance or curtailment of a woman's freedom to
choose an abortion all exemplify that when the judiciary miscalcu-
lates or is unresponsive to enduring popular sentiment, it is inva-
riably checked by the unabated pull of the citizenry's will.
Much anxiety concerning activism disregards practical re-
straints that already curb the judiciary's reach. Given its resource
limitations, the Court is almost bound to be more passive than
94. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
95. Despite controversies over the Supreme Court's busing, school prayer
and abortion decisions, Congress has considered but resisted proposals to curb
the Court's jurisdiction or amend the Constitution. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 44-48 (11 th ed. 1985). Congress' failure to act, after such consider-
ation, may be read as a ratification of the Court's pronouncements,
96. The Court is presently considering whether to overturn Runyon v. Mc-
Crary, 427 U.S 160 (1976), which held that a civil rights law giving all persons
the same right to make and enforce contracts barred private schools from refus-
ing admission on the basis of race. See Patterson v. McCleary Credit Union, 805
F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 65 (1988). An amicus brief has
been filed by members of the Senate and House of Representatives urging the
Court not to overrule Runyon. The brief demonstrates how legislative ratifica-
tion may result even when Congress might claim that the power exercised be-
longed to it, rather than the judiciary. Overturning Runyon would thus invite
criticism of the Court for being disruptively activist at the same time it professed
adherence to restraint.
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active. Of the many constitutional controversies presented to the
Court annually, it has the capacity to review a relative few.97
Although the actual selection of cases may have a profound im-
pact, the judiciary's operations and influence even then are re-
stricted by the granting of certiorari collectively rather than
individually. 98 Cautious exercise of judicial power also is en-
couraged, perhaps intangibly but nonetheless realistically, by
concerns regarding judicial activism that never have and probably
never will abate. Pervasive criticism of judicial activism and fear
of being accused of Lochnerism, even if much of the objection
and concern is misplaced, have become so embedded in the legal
culture that appointees probably are bred to be careful rather
than adventurous.
Because Supreme Court justices have a personal interest in
securing a respectable place in history, incentive exists for learn-
ing from the past. Chief Justice Taney provides a negative role
model for most,99 as does Chief Justice Warren for some. 00 To
the extent history helps guide the fashioning of reputation, Loch-
ner provides clear instruction that the Court should not hold soci-
ety hostage to personal ideology or sterile dogma. However,
Lochnerism affords no basis for a persuasive argument that the
Court should refrain from discerning fundamental values by
probing what it perceives to be the conscience of an enlightened
and reflective citizenry. Failure to suffuse text with meaning de-
rived from that analytical process and effectuate guarantees which
are not self-executing, as history shows, may pose a more serious
risk to constitutional governance.
To the extent the Court attempts to fashion principles, which
are anchored in the Constitution, normatively subscribed to by
97. ChiefJustice Vinson observed that "[i]f we took every case in which an
interesting legal question is raised, or our prima facie impression is that the deci-
sion below is erroneous, we could not fulfill the [c]onstitutional and statutory
responsibilities placed upon the Court." Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, 69 S.
CT. V, VI (1949) (forward to volume).
98. "Under the well-settled 'rule of four,' certiorari is granted whenever
four justices vote for a grant .... " C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FED-
ERAL COURTS 551 (3d ed. 1976).
99. As author of the Court's decision upholding slavery, Taney was respon-
sible for a judgment that shattered the public's confidence in the Court and seri-
ously undermined its moral authority. See supra notes 61 & 66-67 and
accompanying text.
100. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, for instance, not only has criticized Warren's
judicial philosophy but observed that "the few opinions of Warren's I have seen
have not been very good . . . but I don't suppose one should hold that against
him; maybe writing opinions is an art for which the knack is acquired." '50's
Memos Illustrate Rehnquist Consistency, Wash. Post, July 20, 1986, at 14, col. 4.
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the populace and responsive to contemporary realities, it may be
faulted for how it resolves a particular issue, but not for its activist
nature. The judiciary invites trouble when it engages in activism
but cannot reasonably be purporting to probe the values of an
enlightened and reflective citizenry, or when it attempts to dis-
guise its motive under a veneer of restraint. The Constitution, as
it has evolved, has not only been a source of legal principles but a
highly romanticized document thought to express the values and
aspirations of society at its best. The Court serves itself and the
citizenry best when it recognizes both of these dimensions.
Constitutional affront is best avoided insofar'as all branches
of government keep in mind "the traditions and conscience of
[the] people."'' ° When the executive or legislature departs from
values to which an informed citizenry normally would subscribe,
however, judicial displacement may be an appropriate response.
Judicial activism is not by definition an institutional transgression.
Occasional and even serious perversion of the Constitution, espe-
cially if done openly, is ultimately preferable to its evisceration by
neglect. An activist Court also may be a conservative one, in a
particularly meaningful sense, insofar as it ensures fidelity to
deeply embedded social values. Discernment and vindication of
those interests may engender sharp disagreement. Such activism
does not justify a response, however, that would neutralize the
judiciary's essential function.
101. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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